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The Intrusion of Federal Immunity Protection into
State Disbarment Proceedings
INTRODUCTION
During the federal extortion trial of Cook County Commissioner
Charles S. Bonk,' two attorneys testified that they paid Bonk nearly
$145,000 in bribes to obtain zoning changes in unincorporated areas
of the county which were highly favorable to their developer-clients.
One of these attorneys, John M. Daley,' testified with immunity
granted under 18 U.S.C. § 6002,1 which prohibits the use of the
witness' testimony, or any information obtained as a result of his
testimony, against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding. In
addition to this protection, however, Daley's immunity order pur-
portedly prevents the use of this compelled testimony against him
in any "administrative proceeding, disciplinary committee, any bar
association or state Supreme Court, in connection with any profes-
sional disciplinary proceeding or disbarment."4 Immediately follow-
ing Daley's testimony the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary Commission began to examine his admissions to determine
whether his conduct warranted disciplinary action, presuming that
the order had no effect on its power.5 The purpose of this article is
1. United States v. Charles S. Bonk, No. 75 Cr 88 (N.D. Ill., June 6, 1975). Bonk was
acquitted by a jury on June 6, 1975, of 12 counts of extortion and five counts of income tax
fraud.
2. Daley, 18th Ward Democratic Committeeman of Chicago and cousin of Chicago Mayor
Richard J. Daley, testified June 4, 1975. He admitted he paid Bonk, Chairman of the Zoning
Committee of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, a total of $45,500 over a period of
seven years to make zoning changes favorable to 17 real estate development transactions.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a
committee or subcommittee of either House,
and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order
issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other informa-
tion compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or other-
wise failing to comply with the order.
4. In Re: John Daley, a Witness Before the Special March, 1974 Grand Jury, No. 71 GJ
3567 (N.D. Ill., July 18, 1974). See APPENmix.
5. Chicago Daily News, June 5, 1975, at 11, col. 3.
Federal Immunity
to examine the power of a state to discipline members of its bar,
what limits the federal government can place on that right, and
what effect, if any, an immunity grant of this form will have on a
state's efforts to use the testimony in disciplinary proceedings.
STATE'S RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE BAR MEMBERS
From the inception of the Union all states within our federal
system have possessed a wide range of sovereign powers by which
they may provide for the public welfare.6 These "police powers" of
the states can only be curtailed by the federal government through
the exercise of one of its enumerated powers or by some means
necessary and appropriate to implement an enumerated power.7 It
is only through this approach to the functioning of the federal sys-
tem that both the federal and state governments can coexist as dual
sovereigns within the geographical boundaries of the state.'
Right to Discipline Bar Members
Among the sovereign powers reserved to the states are the right
to maintain a judicial system and the right to appoint officers to
administer the states' laws These rights include the inherent power
to determine the qualifications for office and the conditions upon
which their citizens may pursue their various callings.10 These
rights, reserved to the states by the Constitution," cannot be in-
fringed by the federal government as long as the state legislative and
judicial departments remain within their separate sphere of power. 2
Activities which are considered beyond the reach of the Congress are
those which are completely within a particular state, which do not
affect other states, and which do not interfere with the execution of
the powers of the federal government. 3
This is not to say that the tenth amendment forbids the federal
government to resort to all means necessary to exercise some
granted power.' Congress can occupy a field completely, thereby
6. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
7. People's Ferry Company of Boston v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1857); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 406 (1871).
9. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 126 (1870).
10. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319 (1866).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X, provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
12. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
13. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1,195 (1824).
14. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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suspending any state law. 5 What is clear however, is that the federal
government possesses no inherent power with respect to the internal
affairs of the states. The federal government cannot claim any
power not granted in the Constitution or provided to it by legislation
enacted in the exercise of one of its granted powers. The first prob-
lem presented in the Daley grant of immunity, then, is whether
Illinois possesses the sole right to regulate the membership of the
bar, or whether the federal government can properly interfere with
this right through the exercise of its general powers.
At common law the right to discipline members of the bar was an
inherent power not dependent on statutes or legislative grants. It
was an exclusive right of each particular court to determine who was
qualified to become an attorney and what standards of conduct were
required to remain one.' At one time state supreme courts handled
virtually all disciplinary matters. More recently state courts have
employed the bar associations to aid in the regulation of admissions
and have delegated the responsibility for preliminary investigations
and hearings to discipline committees established by statute.'7
Through this machinery the state exercises its "legitimate interest
in determining whether [an individual] has the qualities of charac-
ter and the professional competence requisite to the practice of
law."' 8 Because the quality of the practice of law affects the public
welfare, the states can require high standards for their attorneys.'9
Limits on the State's Power to Discipline Bar Members
Although this responsibility is primarily a state concern, limits
have been placed upon the exercise of this power when it exceeds
the broad confines of due process, or is in conflict with the exercise
of a federal power occupying the field. Thus, a state qualification
must have some rational connection with the person's fitness or
capacity to practice law and cannot exclude him from the practice
of law in a manner, or for a reason that contravenes the due process
or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.20 In addi-
tion, when Congress has undertaken to federally regulate some area
15. Id. at 114.
16. Ex Parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856); Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F.2d 748, 751
(7th Cir. 1951).
17. Potts, Disbarment Procedure, 24 TEXAS L. Rxv. 161, 175 (1946).
18. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971).
19. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Thread v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281
(1957).
20. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 232, 238-39 (1957).
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of the law relating to its enumerated powers, a state cannot curtail
or expand the practice of law in any manner conflicting with that
legislation .2
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important limitation
upon the power of a State in relation to the members of its bar was
imposed when the fifth amendment self-incrimination protection,
made available to persons in state proceedings in Malloy v. Hogan,"
was held to be sufficient in Spevack v. Klein23 to protect an attorney
from disbarment based solely on his assertion of the privilege at a
disciplinary proceeding. In Spevack, an attorney refused to answer
questions or produce records and papers relating to charges of
"ambulance chasing" since it would subject him to possible crimi-
nal prosecution. The four justice plurality opinion by Justice Doug-
las held that the fifth amendment protection applies to lawyers as
well as other individuals and "should not be watered down by im-
posing dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood
as a price for asserting it. ' '21 Justice Douglas further noted that the
unconstitutionality of imposing a "penalty" for the assertion of the
privilege against compelled testimony was not restricted to fine or
imprisonment, but extended to any sanction by the government
which makes that assertion "costly. 25 Thus, for Justice Douglas,
"[tihe threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing,
professional reputation and of livelihood are powerful forms of com-
pulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. 126
In addition to the right to assert his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, an attorney facing disciplinary sanctions
is entitled to procedural due process, including fair notice of the
charge and the opportunity to present an explanation and a de-
fense.Y This protection is essential since the proceedings are of an
adversary and quasi-criminal nature28 at which the attorney must
defend himself or suffer the loss of his livelihood. Disbarment, a
proceeding designed to protect the public, is a "punishment or pen-
alty imposed on the lawyer" which requires the state to maintain
procedural due process protections.29
21. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
22. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
24. Id. at 514.
25. Id. at 515.
26. Id. at 516.
27. In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
28. Id. at 551.
29. Id. at 550.
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Another limitation placed on the state's power over the practice
of law exists where Congress has established regulations relating to
a particular area of law within which it has the enumerated power
to govern. One such challenge to a state's right to set standards for
the practice of law came in the case of Sperry v. Florida,30 in which
Florida sought to limit practice before patent courts within the
State to licensed attorneys. Congress, in establishing the patent
courts, had authorized the Commissioner of Patents to regulate
practice before those specialized courts. The Commissioner's regu-
lations allowed nonlawyers to represent applicants. In denying Flor-
ida the absolute right to regulate its courts, the Court said:
Nor do we doubt that Florida has a substantial interest in regulat-
ing the practice of law within the State and that, in the absence
of any federal legislation, it could validly prohibit nonlawyers from
engaging in this circumscribed form of patent practice. But "the
law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield" when incompatible with federal legisla-
tion .3
The first question that must be considered, then, is whether or not
disciplinary proceedings fall within the scope of the self-
incrimination clause as it relates to penalties. If this is true, then
the immunized testimony could not be used in later disbarment
proceedings since it would be a penalty attached to the witness'
testimony. On the other hand, if disbarment and suspension fall
outside the privilege, it becomes necessary to consider whether Con-
gress intended to interfere with the states' right to regulate attor-
neys by enacting immunity legislation that goes beyond the consti-
tutional scope of the fifth amendment. Absent such congressional
intent, the validity of the Daley grant must rest in the district
court's power to expand immunity beyond the scope of the statute
to include protection from disbarment. If no congressional intent to
interfere can be found, and the district court could not enlarge the
scope of immunity, then such unorthodox grants may be inade-
quate-ineffectual in preventing use of an attorney's testimony in
disciplinary proceedings.
SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE IN PRIOR IMMUNITY STATUTES
Immunity legislation is primarily a compromise between two
competing interests: the right of any individual to be free from being
30. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
31. Id. at 383-84, citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
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compelled to testify against himself, and the need for the govern-
ment to obtain information for the prosecution of crimes-the pub-
lic's right to every man's evidence. The former was an evidentiary
rule of English law that was considered so vital that it assumed the
mantel of a constitutional protection; 32 the latter, the sovereign's
power over each citizen.3 3 It was through an effort to harmonize
these often contradictory interests that such immunity grants came
to be used and later recognized as "part of our constitutional fab-
ric."13
When the Supreme Court first construed the scope of the self-
incrimination clause in Boyd v. United States,31 it became clear that
certain types of forfeitures and penalties which are not technically
criminal sanctions attached to the act, are nonetheless within the
purview of the constitutional privilege. In that case, the government
brought a civil forfeiture action against an importer under a federal
law which allowed for either fines and imprisonment or for forfeiture
of illegally imported goods. Part of the suit involved a discovery
order by which the government commanded the production of cer-
tain incriminating receipts and documents. The importer's refusal
to comply with the order would have resulted in the acceptance of
the government's allegations as true. The Court held that for pur-
poses of the fifth amendment protection against compelled testi-
mony, the forfeitures were criminal, since the proceedings, "though
they may have been civil in form, are in their nature criminal. '3,
Since the forfeiture was a penalty affixed to a criminal act, it should
be considered within the scope of the privilege.37 In support of this
liberal construction of the amendment Justice Bradley, speaking for
the Court, said:
It may be that it is an obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
32. For a comprehensive treatment of the history and purpose of the privilege against self-
incrimination, see 8 J. WIGMOaE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961); E. GRISWOLD, THE
FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY, (1955); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, 29 MIcH. L. Ray. 1, 191 (1930).
33. See the parliamentary debate on the Bill to Indemnify Evidence, particularly the
remarks of the Duke of Argyle and the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, reported in 12 T. HAN-
SARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 675, 693 (1812). See also Piemonte v. United
States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 n.15 (1956);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 600 (1896).
34. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956); Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 447 (1972).
35. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
36. Id. at 634.
37. Id.
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their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to the gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance.3 1
Although the original source of the phrase is unclear, federal im-
munity statutes dating from the first legislation in 1857 prevented
future prosecution and sought to protect the witness from "any
penalty or forfeiture" which might result from his compelled testi-
mony. In discussing the constitutional privilege in Boyd, the Court
noted the inclusion of the term in the Immunity Act of 1868, 39 which
extended "use" immunity to witnesses testifying in federal court.
The statute provided that no documents or evidence obtained as a
result of judicial proceedings could be used in the prosecution of any
crime "or from the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture by rea-
son of any act or ommission of such party or witness."
The Supreme Court first examined the constitutionality of the
Immunity Act of 1868 in Counselman v. Hitchcock.40 In that case,
the Court held that since the statute only prohibited use of the
witness' testimony, and did not protect him from use of any leads
obtained through his testimony, it was not a substitute for his fifth
amendment privilege. 1 In explicating that privilege, Justice Blatch-
ford said that a strict reading of the amendment would require only
that the witness' testimony itself be privileged. However, he main-
tained that the object of the constitutional protection was to insure
that no person, when acting as a witness in any investigation or
judicial proceeding, should be compelled to give testimony which
38. Id. at 635.
39. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37. Later this became Rev. Stat. 860 (1875), and
as such was declared invalid in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). The major
provision of the bill was as follows:
Provided: That no answer or pleading of any party, and no discovery or evidence
obtained by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in this or
any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such
party or witness, or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, or in
any proceeding by or before any officer of the United States, in respect to any crime,
or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture by reason of any act or ommission
of such party or witness: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to
exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for perjury commit-
ted by him in discovery or testifying as aforesaid.
40. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
41. Id. at 564.
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might show, or tend to show, that he had committed a crime.2 "The
privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the
mischief against which it seeks to guard."43
Justice Blatchford focused on the ancient principle of the law of
evidence that a witness "shall not be compelled, in any proceeding
to make a disclosure or to give testimony which will tend to crimi-
nate him or subject him to fines, penalties or forfeitures."'44 The
Court found that it was a reasonable construction of the privilege
to prohibit the use of evidence obtained from the witness' testimony
which links him to the crime as well as his direct admissions. In
conclusion the Court said:
We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or
witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating
question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privi-
lege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. Section
860 of the Revised Statutes does not supply a complete protection
from all the perils against which the constitutional prohibition was
designed to guard, and is not a full substitute for that prohibition.
In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to
be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecu-
tion for the offence to which the question relates.45
In response to Counselman, Congress quickly passed" the Im-
munity Act of 1893,11 which provided the "transactional immunity"
which the decision appeared to require. The constitutional validity
of even this broad protection was challenged by a witness called to
testify in a federal grand jury investigation into rate-fixing by rail-
roads. In United States v. James, 8 this challenge to the statute was
42. Id. at 586.
43. Id. at 562.
44. Id. at 563-64.
45. Id. at 585.
46. Counselman was decided Jan. 11, 1892. Senator Cullum introduced a new immunity
bill on Jan. 27, 1892. 23 CONG. REc. 573 (1892).
47. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 provided:
That no person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing
books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, ..
on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or
otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture. But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Com-
mission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in
any such case or proceeding. . ..
48. 60 F. 257 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
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upheld by Judge Grosscup, who rejected the government's limited
construction of the fifth amendment as envisioned by the framers:
Did they originate such privilege simply to safeguard themselves
against the law-inflicted penalties and forfeitures? Did they take
no thought of the pains of practical outlawry? The stated penalties
and forfeitures of the law might be set aside; but was there no pain
in disfavor and odium among neighbors, in excommunication from
church or societies that might be governed by the prevailing views,
in the private liabilities that the law might authorize, or in the
unfathomable disgrace, not susceptible of formulation in language,
which a known violation of law brings upon the offender. . . . In
my opinion, the privilege of silence, against a criminal accusation,
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, was meant to extend to all the
consequence of disclosure."9
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this view, and,
in Brown v. Walker,50 upheld the 1893 statute even though it did not
protect the witness from the "infamy and disgrace" of his exposure.
The five-judge majority opinion made clear that although the stat-
ute does not shield the witness from "personal disgrace or opprob-
rium attaching to the exposure of his crime," such penalty does not
exempt him from the duty to testify after he is given immunity.5'
The statute became a model for all subsequent federal and state"
immunity legislation. The scope of the fifth amendment protection
was considered to extend only to the criminal penalties attached to
a witness' testimony. 53
The scope of the penalties attached to a witness' testimony was
not challenged again until a member of the Communist Party, or-
dered to testify under a similar immunity provision, claimed that
governmental sanctions which attached to Communist Party mem-
bership effectively abrogated his fifth amendment privilege. 54 The
49. Id. at 264.
50. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
51. Id. at 605.
52. For a compilation of the state immunity statutes, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281,
n.11 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
53. 161 U.S. at 605-06.
54. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Disabilities created by federal law for
Communist Party members included: prohibition of employment in the federal government
and in defense facilities, 50 U.S.C. § 784 (1970); ineligibility for a passport, 50 U.S.C. § 785
(1970); the possibility of internment, 50 U.S.C. §§ 811-826 (1970); the possibility of loss of
employment as a longshoreman, 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1970). Moreover, under the Subversive
Activities Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), it is a crime for a person who is a member of
a Communist organization registered under the Act to engage in certain activities, e.g., to
hold office or employment with any labor organization.
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Second Circuit, while affirming the district court's order compelling
the witness to testify, recognized that new governmental sanctions
not existing at the time of Brown might call for a re-examination of
the principles underlying the Court's decision in that case.55 How-
ever, in Ullmann v. United States," a seven-justice majority upheld
the Brown v. Walker rationale despite these additional "penalties"
affixed to the testimony. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, announcing the
opinion of the Court, said:
[T]he immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which
generate the fear justifying the invocation of the privilege: The
interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only whenever a
witness is asked to incriminate himself-in other words, to give
testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge.
But if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amend-
ment ceases to apply.57
In the dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Jus-
tice Black concurred, cited the wide range of disabilities created by
federal law which affect members of the Communist Party. These
included: inelegibility for employment in the federal government
and defense facilities, disqualification for a passport, the risk of
internment, and the loss of employment in labor unions.5 1 In addi-
tion, Communists faced restrictions by state and local governments,
as well as hostility from private employers and the public at large.
Justice Douglas argued that these types of sanctions should be clas-
sified as forfeitures attaching to an admission under compelled tes-
timony, in the same way that the forfeiture of property was classi-
fied in Boyd v. United States. Justice Douglas further maintained:
The forfeiture of property on compelled testimony is no more
abhorrent than the forfeiture of rights of citizenship. Any forfeiture
of rights as a result of compelled testimony is at war with the Fifth
Amendment.59
Justice Douglas called for either the reversal of the lower court
based on Boyd, or for an overruling of Brown v. Walker and adop-
tion of the minority view in that case which concluded the right to
silence created by the fifth amendment is beyond the reach of Con-
gress10 Justice Field's dissent in Brown and Judge Grosscup's opin-
55. United States v. Ullmann, 221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955), aff'd 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
56. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
57. Id. at 431.
58. United States v. Ullmann, 350 U.S. 422, 440 n.1 (1956) (Douglas J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 442.
60. Id. at 440.
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ion in United States v. James, were cited to show there was strong
historical basis for the view that the amendment was designed to
protect the accused from all compulsory testimony "which would
expose him to infamy and disgrace" as well as that which would lead
to a criminal conviction." Loss of office, loss of dignity, loss of face
were all forms of punishment associated with infamy, which was
historically considered to be as effective a punishment as fine and
imprisonment.62
The critical point is that the Constitution places the right of
silence beyond the reach of government. The Fifth Amendment
stands between the citizen and his government. When public opin-
ion casts a person into the outer darkness, as happens today when
a person is exposed as a Communist, the government brings in-
famy on the head of the witness when it compels disclosure. That
is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits. 3
PROTECTION FROM DISBARMENT
The opinions of the Court in Spevack v. Klein" did not focus on
the extent to which the self-incrimination clause would provide pro-
tection from disbarment to witnesses compelled to testify. Thus, the
case left unanswered serious questions regarding the constitution-
ality of existing immunity statutes.65 Would immunity have to be
extended to protect an attorney from disbarment before he could be
penalized for refusing to answer? If so, the traditional scope of im-
munity, securing the witness only against a criminal prosecution,
might not be constitutionally sufficient. There was also concern that
states would no longer be able to inflict these types of non-criminal
penalties upon an attorney forced to disclose incriminating informa-
tion. Commentators reasoned that if these penalties were deemed
to fall within the purview of the self-incrimination privilege the only
rational way to force the witness to testify would be to adopt Justice
Douglas' view expressed in Ullmann v. United States."
The question of whether the self-incrimination clause provides
protection against disbarment hinges on whether disbarment in it-
self may be characterized as a criminal sanction for the purpose of
61. Id. at 449.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id. at 454.
64. See text accompanying notes 23 through 26 supra.
65. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 202-05 (1967).
66. Id. at 205; Niles and Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone in Bar
Discipline?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124 (1967). See, Franck, The Myth of Spevack v. Kline, 54
A.B.A.J. 970 (1968).
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invoking the privilege, rather than a civil proceeding. In order to
determine where disbarment falls within the spectrum of civil ver-
sus criminal cases, the courts focus on either the legislative purpose
of the proceeding, or the affect of the proceeding upon the individual
involved.
Based on the first analysis, disbarment proceedings have gener-
ally been considered either civil proceedings or sui generis, neither
technically criminal nor civil.67 This traditional view was discussed
by Justice Cardozo while serving on the New York Court of Appeals.
In In re Rouss,58 an attorney had been compelled to testify under an
immunity grant protecting him from any "penalty or forfeiture"
which might result from his testimony. Justice Cardozo held that
the immunity statute conferred protections only as broad as the
fifth amendment privilege and disciplinary proceedings were be-
yond the scope of that protection.
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
fair private and professional character is one of them. Compliance
with that condition is essential at the moment of admission; but
it is equally essential afterwards. . . .Whenever the condition is
broken the privilege is lost. . . .To strike the unworthy lawyer
from the rolls is not to add to the pains and penalties of crime. The
examination into character is renewed; and the test of fitness is no
longer satisfied. For these reasons courts have repeatedly said that
disbarment is not punishment. 9
This view interprets the proceedings as remedial rather than penal.
They are designed to protect the public, rather than punish the
attorney for his conduct.
However, the Supreme Court in In Re Ruffalo,70 emphasized the
affect of the proceedings on the individual involved, and character-
ized disbarment proceedings summarily. The Court stated that
"disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or
penalty imposed on the lawyer."'" As a result, the Court found the
attorney was entitled to procedural due process, which included fair
67. Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 231 N.E.2d 718, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968); In re Damisch, 38 Ill. 2d 195, 230 N.E.2d 254 (1967) (nothing in
Spevack affected the rule distinguishing between disciplinary proceedings and criminal pros-
ecutions); In re Selig, 32 App. Div. 2d 213, 214-15, 302 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95-96 (1969) (testimony
by an attorney to a grand jury to purge himself of contempt was admissible in a disciplinary
proceeding).
68. 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
69. Id. at 85, 116 N.E. at 783.
70. 390 U.S. 544 (1968).
71. Id. at 550.
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notice of the charges and an opportunity to defend or respond.72 For
these purposes the Court, through Justice Douglas, considered the
proceedings "quasi-criminal."73 In support of this analysis, Justice
Douglas cited an analogous situation involving the criminal aspects
of juvenile proceedings, with respect to the self-incrimination pro-
tection, in In re Gault.74 There, the Court weighed the governmental
and individual interests involved and held that despite the rehabili-
tative intentions of the juvenile court system, the interests of the
juvenile in a delinquency proceeding are similar to an adult in a
criminal proceeding. Therefore, the juvenile could properly invoke
the fifth amendment protection.75
State courts have interpreted the scope of Ruffalo narrowly, find-
ing that it "hardly stands for an equation of criminal and discipli-
nary proceedings."7 Disciplinary proceedings, unlike juvenile pro-
ceedings, cannot result in incarceration and involve a stronger gov-
ernmental interest.7 7 Since the Supreme Court in Ruffalo did not
expressly term the proceedings criminal in nature, the state courts
have relied on the rationale of Ullmann to disbar lawyers who have
been granted immunity protection under either state or federal stat-
utes.7 This conforms with the established view that neither the
failure of the state to prosecute an attorney 7 acquittal of a crime,
s°
nor executive pardon for the offense,' 1 have been sufficient to pre-
vent disbarment based on the same act.
State courts have interpreted Spevack to make the fifth amend-
ment privilege applicable to disbarment proceedings only to the
extent that the state cannot compel testimony which could lead to
a criminal charge, or discipline an attorney solely because he in-
vokes the privilege at the disbarment or any other proceeding.
It has been suggested, however, that disbarment be treated as a
72. Id.
73. Id. at 551.
74. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
75. Id. at 33.
76. Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 384, 244 N.E.2d 456, 466, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937,951
(1968).
77. Black v. State Bar of California, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 684, 499 P.2d 968, 974, 103 Cal. Rptr.
288, 294 (1968), and cases cited therein.
78. In re Schwarz, 51 Ill. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, reh.
denied, 410 U.S. 917 (1973); In re Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920, 237 N.E.2d 75, 289 N.Y.S.2d
755, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968).
79. Cate v. Rivers, 246 S.C. 35, 142 S.E.2d 369 (1965).
80. Zitny v. State Bar of California, 64 Cal.2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 51 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966);
In re Pennico, 36 N.J. 401, 177 A.2d 721 (1962); In re Browning, 23 Ill. 2d 483, 179 N.E.2d 14
(1962), overruling People ex rel. Deneen v. John, 212 Ill. 615, 72 N.E. 789 (1904).
81. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Ponder, 263 La. 743, 269 So. 2d 228 (1972).
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criminal proceeding for all purposes of the fifth amendment privi-
lege. In order to obtain an attorney's testimony, the prosecutor
would then be forced to insure protection from disbarment in addi-
tion to traditional immunity.2 This raises the objectionable possi-
bility that an attorney whose admitted conduct has shown that he
is unfit to practice law will be beyond the reach of the state. How-
ever, this problem is no different qualitatively than that presented
by the operation of immunity statutes in general. It does differ
quantitatively since the potential for harm to third persons is in-
creased due to the attorney's continued fiduciary position within the
state. This undesirable fact only indicates that the social cost of
granting such immunity will often be too high. The system of im-
munity was intended to serve as a method of balancing these costs
to society with the potential benefits that may also be present. In
every instance in which immunity is extended, it results not only
in social benefit from the use of the testimony, but also in the social
cost of foregoing the punishment of the individual. It is doubtful
that any court will voluntarily classify its disbarment proceedings
as criminal so as to create the privilege. As Justice Cardozo con-
cluded in In re Rouss: "We will not declare, unless driven to it by
sheer necessity, that a confessed criminal has been entrenched by
the very confession of his guilt beyond the power of removal. '83
SCOPE OF IMMUNITY UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 6002
In 1970 Congress undertook to consolidate the multitude of fed-
eral immunity statutes which had proliferated since 1893. Five new
immunity sections" replaced the prior statutes with a comprehen-
sive outline governing the granting of immunity to witnesses before
the federal courts, grand jury proceedings, administrative and con-
gressional committee hearings. Congress incorporated the proposals
of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws, 5 which had
taken a new look at the scope of federal immunity in light of Su-
preme Court cases beginning with Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion of New York."' There, the Court held that state grants of im-
82. Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity and Comment in Bar Disciplinary
Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. REv. 84, 108-12 (1973).
83. 221 N.Y. at 85, 116 N.E. at 783.
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005. The immunity provisions included the express repeal of all
other statutory immunity grants which operated under various agencies and commissions.
For a complete list of the 55 immunity statutes repealed by 18 U.S.C. § 6001, et seq., see
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS, at 1445-
46 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
85. Id. at 1447-48.
86. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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munity will protect the witness from use of his testimony against
him in federal court, as well as any evidence obtained from leads
provided in the testimony. 7 This construction of the scope of im-
munity protection in both federal and state grants, cast doubt as to
the necessity of the broad "absolute immunity" from prosecution
referred to in the dicta of Counselman,9 permitting instead merely
use/derivative use immunity.
As a result of the Commission's recommendations, Congress
adopted a standardized immunity statute which prohibited the use
of "testimony or other information compelled under the order (or
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony
or other information) 89 in any criminal case. The legislation also
deleted the "penalty or forfeiture" clause, intending the statutory
immunity to be as broad as, but no broader than, the privilege
against self-incrimination. 0 It is the ommission of this clause which
bears most directly upon the discussion of the Daley grant of im-
munity. It was in this specific act that Congress evidenced an intent
to confine the immunity to the constitutional privilege as it is pres-
ently construed by the Court-to protect the witness from use of his
testimony in any subsequent criminal proceedings.
During the formulation of the standardized immunity statute
which was later adopted by Congress, the Commission considered
the problem surrounding the "penalty or forfeiture" phrase in the
then existing provisions. The drafters were particularly troubled by
possible judicial interpretation which might give the phrase an inde-
pendent significance beyond the criminality referred to in the fifth
amendment." The Commission Report cites with disapproval the
case of Lee v. Civil Aeronautics Board,"2 where an allegedly inatten-
tive co-pilot involved in a mid-air collision was granted immunity
and testified in a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) administrative
hearing. The administrator later brought an action to suspend the
pilot's license, but the CAB ruled that he had obtained immunity
from penalties and forfeitures including suspension. Although the
court of appeals dismissed the case for lack of standing, one judge
discussed the merits in the case and agreed with the CAB.
87. Id. at 79.
88. Id. at 77-79. For a discussion of the scope of federal immunity following Murphy, see
Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege: New Devel-
opments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 327 (1966).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
90. S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Seass. 144-45 (1969); H.R. RE. No. 91-1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970); H.R. RE. No. 91-1188, 91st Cong., 2d Seass. 7, 12 (1970).
91. WORKING PAPERS at 1414-16, 1432-33.
92. 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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The suspension of these pilots would be a forfeiture of a privilege,
even if not a right. The immunity statute extends to forfeitures as
well as to penalties. The question, then, is whether the proceeding
is punitive or merely remedial. In this connection we go to the Fifth
Amendment cases. Any reading of the complaint shows the action
prayed is purely punitive. The complaint says baldly that the men
were careless and therefore ought to be suspended. It does not
allege the pilots to be unqualified. I think they were protected by
reason of their testimony taken in the investigation .
3
It might be possible to distinguish between penal actions taken
for improper conduct, which would be protected by an immunity
grant, and remedial actions for unfitness, which would not. The
Commission felt this clarification process would be further compli-
cated by attempts to give an independent meaning to the "penalty
or forfeiture" clause." "In other words, a focus on this phrase in
immunity statutes may lead to conferring a broader protection than
needed to replace the constitutional privilege. . . ."I' Since the
phrase does not appear in the fifth amendment, there is no reason
to incorporate it in immunity statutes. 6 Professor Robert G. Dixon,
Jr., of the George Washington University National Law Center, who
prepared the Comment on Immunity as a special consultant to the
Commission, discussed this aspect of the new law at the Senate
hearings:
We do not continue the language from 1893, speaking of a "pen-
alty" or a "forfeiture." I would suggest-and this is in the re-
cord-that in one sense the penalty or forfeiture concept is inadvis-
able. On page 27 of the Commission document there is mention of
a case, Lee v. CAB, where the penalty or forfeiture concept seemed
to be operating-had that case gone to its conclusion-to protect
an airline pilot from loss of a license on the basis of immunity
acquired in an accident investigation proceeding. I think that is a
little extreme. It goes beyond the scope of the fifth amendment,
unless the Court expressly chooses to construe the fifth amend-
ment in that direction. 7
This use/derivitive use immunity provision was upheld in
Kastigar v. United States." The Supreme Court first rejected the
93. Id. at 953 (Prettyman, J., dissenting).
94. WORKING PAPERS at 1415.
95. Id. at 1416.
96. Id.
97. Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., compiled in MEASURES RELATING TO ORGANIZED
CRIME at 326 (1969).
98. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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defendant's claim that no immunity grant could supplant the fifth
amendment privilege of silence, and expressly reaffirmed the hold-
ings of Brown and Ullmann." The Court also dismissed the broad
language in Counselman as dicta which was unnecessary for the
holding of the case. The Kastigar court confined the privilege to
actual testimony and any "fruits" in the form of leads and new
evidence which were derived from that testimony. 00 These protec-
tions alone were found to be coextensive with the self-incrimination
clause and Congress need not provide anything further. By making
the immunity protection as broad as, but no broader than, the fifth
amendment privilege, Congress did not intend to interfere with the
States' right to discipline their bar members since these actions
have not been considered criminal proceedings.' 0 '
THE DALEY GRANT
If it was the intent of Congress to limit the immunity protection
under this statute to criminal proceedings, the grant to Daley under
section 6002 could be effective only if state disciplinary proceedings
are now construed to fall within the meaning of a "criminal case."
Otherwise, the district court's authority must rest upon some under-
lying or inherent power which would allow it to interfere with the
state's regulatory powers over its attorneys.
Despite the classification, in Ruffalo, of disciplinary proceedings
as being quasi-criminal in nature, courts in Illinois'0 2 and New
York,1 3 which have considered the use of immunized testimony in
disbarment proceedings, have held that the self-incrimination pro-
tection does not apply. The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently
considered the scope of the immunity grant under section 6002 in a
case similar to the facts surrounding the Daley case.' 4 During an
ongoing probe into political corruption in the state, an attorney
testified in federal court and admitted engaging in illegal transac-
tions. The revelations made under this immunity grant consisted of
the major portion of the evidence produced at his disbarment pro-
ceedings. The attorney claimed his immunity should protect him
99. Id. at 448.
100. Id. at 453.
101. See text accompanying notes 67 through 81 supra.
102. In re Schwarz, 51 Il. 2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, reh.
denied, 410 U.S. 917 (1973).
103. Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 231 N.E.2d 718, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1968); In re Ungar, 27 App. Div. 2d 925, 282 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1967), cert.
denied sub nom., Ungar v. Association of the Bar of N.Y., 389 U.S. 1007 (1968).
104. Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 329 A.2d 1 (1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975).
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from the use of his own testimony against him since the disbarment
was essentially a criminal proceeding. The court held that despite
language in Spevack and Ruffalo, disbarment proceedings are not
criminal since they are not designed or intended as punishment. 05
Based upon the holdings in the New York and Illinois cases, our
repeated statements that disbarment proceedings are not criminal
proceedings, Kastigar, and the traditional view of Anglo-American
jurisprudence that disbarment is intended not as punishment, but
as protection to the public, we hold that this proceeding is not a
"criminal case" within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 6002 or the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.'"6
We are faced, then, with the following situation. The district
court, which has no discretion in granting immunity properly sub-
mitted by a U.S. attorney,07 has extended the scope of the protec-
tions beyond that required by the Supreme Court and even in direct
contravention of the expressed desires of Congress. Congress has the
power to expand the scope of the protection beyond that which is
constitutionally required, provided protection such as this is neces-
sary for the exercise of federal power.0 8 However, immunity of this
type may be inappropriate in light of the substantial state interest
in disciplining attorneys. In any case, that question is not present
in Daley, since Congress has declined to exceed the constitutional
scope of the fifth amendment.
Can the district court, in ordering the immunity grant upon the
recommendation of the U.S. attorney, effectively enlarge the scope
of a plainly written statute? In the past, it has been held to be an
improper action by the judiciary to consider the scope of an immun-
ity act, which expressly concerned only judicial witnesses, to have
been impliedly amended by Congress to pertain to congressional
proceedings as well.0 9 Similarly, whenever federal power is exerted
105. Id. at 311, 329 A.2d at 6.
106. Id. at 312, 329 A.2d at 7.
107. In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973); In re Baldinger, 356 F. Supp. 153 (C.D.
Cal. 1973).
108. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 511 (1960). See Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 436 (1956). In exercise of its conceded power, Congress cannot be restricted from
the most effective use of that power by a state power to prosecute criminals. In Adams v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 (1954), the Court could not say that the immunity provisions
were not "appropriate" and clearly adopted to that end. Congress, in the legitimate exercise
of its powers, enacts the supreme law of the land and state courts are bound even though
federal law affects their rules of practice. Similarly in People v. Stievater, 77 Misc. 2d 761,
356 N.Y.S. 2d 915 (1972), it was held that when federal courts grant transactional immunity,
state courts are barred from bringing any criminal prosecution since Congress may provide
immunity beyond the scope of the fifth amendment privilege as construed in Kastigar.
109. United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95 (1964).
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within what would otherwise be the domain of the state, the justifi-
cation must clearly appear."0 The Court has not been quick to as-
sume that legislation was meant to affect a significant change in the
sensitive relation which exists between the federal and state crimi-
nal jurisdictions."'
Could the federal courts, because of their inherent concern with
the protection of federal criminal prosecutions, interfere with the
proper supervision of attorneys by state courts? An analogous situa-
tion arose in New York when three attorneys, granted immunity in
state court, sought protection of their fifth amendment privilege
through federal injunctive relief from disciplinary proceedings
based on their testimony."' The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision to abstain from the proceedings since the state had
a primary interest in adjudicating the continuing professional fit-
ness and character of its officers. The court said:
Today more than ever, the integrity of the bar is of public concern
and the state, which licenses those who practice in its courts, and
which is the only body that can impose sanctions upon those ad-
mitted to practice in its courts, should not be deterred or diverted
from the venture by the interloping of a federal court."3
CONCLUSION
In Illinois, disbarment proceedings remain a noncriminal action
through which the State properly exercises control over the mem-
bers of the bar. This power is among those reserved powers, vested
in the states, which cannot be infringed upon by the federal govern-
ment unless it affirmatively acts in the exercise of its general power.
In attempting to interfere with these state proceedings, the district
court and the U.S. attorney have exceeded their statutory and dis-
cretionary powers with respect to the granting of federal immunity
protection.
Perhaps this additional incentive of protection from disbarment
or state disciplinary action is needed to obtain full cooperation from
attorneys involved in criminal conduct. It might well be true that
society will tolerate the continued practice of some of these attor-
neys in exchange for the removal from public office of officials in-
110. State of Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 (1931).
111. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971), limiting the application of the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970), to what was authorized by Congress.
112. Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1975);
Anonymous J. v. Bar Association of Erie County, 515 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1975).
113. Anonymous v. Association of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 515 F.2d 427, 432 (2d Cir.
1975).
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volved in the same criminal dealings. It is, however, beyond the
discretionary powers of the federal prosecutors to make these value
judgments when Congress has not given them the power to grant
immunity from disbarment. The state's interest in the matter re-
mains paramount and unimpaired by this attempted exertion of
federal control over disbarment proceedings. Such immunity orders
stand in the way of the state's power to determine an attorney's
fitness to remain a member of its bar.
PATRICK E. DEADY
APPENDIX
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
IN RE: JOHN DALEY,
A WITNESS BEFORE THE 71 GJ 3567
SPECIAL MARCH 1974 GRAND JURY
ORDER
This matter coming on to be heard on the petition of the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, by JAMES R. THOMPSON, United
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, for an order
instructing JOHN DALEY to testify and to produce evidence before
the Special March 1974 Grand Jury, said JOHN DALEY being a
witness before the said grand jury who has asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination, and the Court having considered said
petition of the United States Attorney and the letter approving the
application of this Court from the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, attached
to said petition:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JOHN DALEY shall not be
excused from testifying or from producing books, papers or other
evidence before the said grand jury on the ground that the testimony
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him, and that.
JOHN DALEY shall proceed forthwith to the place of meeting of
the said grand jury and answer the questions which he is asked and
produce what evidence is required of him without further asserting
his privilege against self-incrimination, and IT IS FURTHER OR-
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DERED that no testimony of the witness, JOHN DALEY, com-
pelled under this order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against him in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with this
order, in accordance with the provisions of Section 6002, Title 18,
United States Code.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no testimony of the witness,
JOHN DALEY, compelled under this order as above, may be used
against him in any administrative proceeding, disciplinary commit-
tee, any bar association or state Supreme Court, in conjunction with
any professional disciplinary proceeding or disbarment.
Enter:
Edwin A. Robson (Signed)
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Dated at Chicago, Illinois
this 18th day of July, 1974.
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